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untried. It may be said that on October 26 the Bank's 
equipment consisted of little more than a printed copy 
of the Federal Reserve Act;  whereas, today, it is a fully 
equipped bank with an organization perfectly capable 
of meeting any emergency and is promptly transacting 
the business entrusted to its care. 
Federal Reserve Control of 
Credit by  Benjamin  Strong 
In the early days of the Federal Reserve, changes in 
the discount  rate were the principal  instrument through 
which the central bank exercised control over credit 
conditions. In this -address, Strong explains the use of 
discount rate changes as a means of controlling  the 
volume of credit and influencing  interest  rate move- 
ments. He considers criteria for discount rate  changes, 
concluding that in the absence  of gold movements 
under a reestablished  gold standard,  policy makers 
have no option but to look to general economic 
conditions. 
Since the Federal  Reserve Banks were established, 
and, in recent years in increasing quantity, the reports 
of the System  have  been so complete and  have 
described the operations in such detail that students of 
banking require hardly more than the official reports to 
gain a fairly complete knowledge of the business con- 
ducted by the System. 
Even  those who  have  not studied this literature 
understand that the Reserve Banks hold the banking 
reserves of the country; that they discount paper for 
their member banks; that they invest in bills or bankers 
acceptances and in the securities of the United States 
government; that they issue and redeem the principal 
currency of the country and  distribute the metallic 
money coined by the mints; that they collect checks 
and practically all other types of instruments of pay- 
ment for their  members; effect the settlement of the 
domestic exchanges; and, in their capacity  as fiscal 
agents of the Treasury, borrow all the money required 
for the Treasury's operations; handle the Government 
debt; receive on deposit the revenues; and pay checks 
drawn by the disbursing officers. 
Address delivered before students of the Graduate College, Harvard 
University,  Cambridge, Massachusetts,  November  28, 1922. 
It is important that this business be visualized as to 
volume as well as character. Bearing in mind that the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York does about 40 per- 
cent of the business of the whole System, its transac- 
tions for the 10 months of this year were briefly as 
follows: It held an average of $1,150,000,000  of 
reserves, practically all gold; discounted $46,000 
pieces  of paper  aggregating  $5,200,000,000 for  its 
members; purchased 81,000 acceptances for itself and 
for other Reserve Banks and for member banks and 
foreign banks aggregating $1,150,000,000; and for 
account of all Reserve and other banks and of  the Gov- 
ernment and foreign banks purchased and sold 
$2,400,000,000 of Government and other securities; it 
counted and handled 315,000,000  pieces of paper cur- 
rency aggregating $2,000,000,000 and handled a daily 
average of 26 tons of coin; collected 118,300,000 
checks, notes, drafts,  coupons, and  other negotiable 
instruments aggregating $51,000,000,000;  and affected 
payments by telegraph, over the 15,000 miles of tele- 
graph wires which the System now operates, aggregat- 
ing $17,600,000,000. Its transactions for the Treasury 
as the Government's fiscal agent were of too great a 
volume and variety  to express briefly in figures. 
These figures are  recounted for the purpose  of 
emphasizing the character and extent of the contact of 
the Reserve System with the credit and currency oper- 
ations of the country and, consequently, the signifi- 
cance of the functions which the Reserve Banks 
exercise. 
As to the System's policies and the purposes which 
inspired them, there is now an extensive literature in 
the shape of critical books, magazine articles, and pub- 
lic addresses. It would be but repetition for me to go 
over ground so fully discussed by so many competent 
students and critics. 
There is, however,  one function of the Reserve Sys- 
tem  the importance  of  which  cannot  be  over- 
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tonight because it is, in fact, the heart of the System 
upon which the operation of every other part  depends. 
I refer to the entirely new element which was superim- 
posed upon our banking System in 1914 by the estab- 
lishment of the Reserves Banks, which were given the 
power to influence or to regulate or to control the vol- 
ume of credit. Every other function  exercised by the 
Reserve Banks sinks into insignificance along side of 
the far-reaching importance of this major function. 
Without regard to the views which you may entertain 
as to the various theories in regard to the purchasing 
power of money, or what may be more popularly dis- 
cribed as the quantity theory of money, there is hardly 
anyone who is familiar with these matters who will not 
agree that no influence upon prices is so great in the 
long run as is the influence of considerable changes in 
the quantity of money, by which I mean not only metal 
coins and paper money, but bank deposits upon which 
checks may be drawn. The Reserve Act did in fact, 
whether  by conscious  design  of its authors  or not, 
bring about  an  almost revolutionary change in three 
important particulars in bank credit which may in turn 
have had an important relation to prices. (1) The Act 
originally reduced  the reserve requirements  of the 
national  banks,  and, subsequently  in  1917,  reduced 
them again. The effect of this was to make reserve 
money more efficient in that it was permitted to sustain 
a larger volume of loans and deposits than previously 
had been permitted.  (2) By conferring  the so-called 
clearing  house functions  upon the Reserve Bank, it 
speeded up the whole System of payments; checks are 
collected and paid more promptly; the course of cur- 
rency shipments throughout the country has been 
greatly shortened and currency passes more promptly 
to points of redemption; and the countrywide clearing 
house, known as the Gold Settlement Fund,  operated 
on the basis of daily telegraph settlements, has greatly 
shortened the length of time required to effect settle- 
ment of the entire domestic exchanges of the country. 
(3) But the most important change, as I have stated, is 
that conferring the power upon the Reserve Banks to 
actually permit or influence changes in the volume of 
money which serves as bank reserves or circulates as 
currency. My thesis, therefore, is addressed solely to 
this question of the regulation of the volume of credit 
and to make clear what a change  has taken place 
because of the granting of this power. 
Credit conditions before 1914 
Let me refresh your memory as to how credit matters 
operated prior to 1914: Practically all of the commercial 
banks and trust companies of the country were subject 
to various statutory limits as to the minimum amounts 
of cash and  redeposited reserve which they were 
required  to carry.  Except by legislative change  in 
reserve requirements, there was no possibility of 
increasing the supply of reserve money beyond what 
arose through gold production or gold imports, neither 
could the supply of reserve money  be contracted 
unless  gold was exported.  So it may be generally 
stated that the total reserves of all the banks was inca- 
pable of contraction except by paying it out to the pub- 
lic or exporting it; and equally incapable of expansion 
unless redeposited by the public or unless gold flowed 
into the country from abroad or was produced from  the 
mines. Bear in mind I say total  and not percentage. 
This had serious consquences in its relation to that 
mysterious phenomenon  which is now being so care- 
fully investigated and which we call the business (or, as 
I would prefer to call it, the credit) cycle. 
At one  extreme of the cycle  the reserves of the 
banks regularly became impaired. With deficient bank 
reserves we were liable to see rates for "speculative" 
money advance to 100 percent or even more at times, 
and the charge for credit to merchants and manufac- 
turers became a severe burden upon production and 
distribution. In such a situation almost any percussion 
cap would start an explosion. In 1893-95  deficient reve- 
nues of the government and an unfavorable trade bal- 
ance which resulted in gold exports, coming at a time 
when there  was agitation for a change in our monetary 
laws, led to great uneasiness.  The reserves of the New 
York Clearing  House banks showed shortages  from 
$1,300,000 to $16,500,000. Fear developed that the 
Treasury would not have sufficient  gold to meet its 
obligations  and finally the crash came  on  June 21, 
1893, resulting in the New York banks, and banks gen- 
erally throughout the country, suspending  currency 
payments; very largely suspending cash settlements 
between themselves for checks sent for collection not 
only through the local Clearing House but throughout 
the country. At that time a  total of $41,490,000  Clearing 
House loan certificates were issued. 
Much the same thing happened in 1907, when after  a 
period of deficient banking  reserves running from 
$1,200,000  to $54,100,000,  the extended condition of a 
number of New York City banks caused alarm and gen- 
eral suspensions of like character to those of the early 
1890s throughout the country. Call money loaned as 
high as 125 percent; currency went to 4 percent pre- 
mium; and the domestic exchanges again were frozen. 
Then again at the other extreme of the cycle, after a 
period of liquidation, surplus reserves poured into the 
money centers. After this same liquidation in the early 
1890s the New York Clearing House banks at one time 
showed surplus reserves of $111,600,000. And bear in 
mind that at that time the total required reserves of the 
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what they now are. Money then  loaned at less than 
1 percent. And the same occurrence was witnessed 
after the liquidation of 1907 when the surplus reserves 
of the New York City Clearing House banks rose to 
$71,000,000. 
While  under the conditions first described, every 
bank was seeking to withdraw loans, under the condi- 
tions  last described, the banks were forcing money into 
the market. Money would become almost unloanable 
and the temptation to the speculator and his kind was 
extreme. I personally recall making loans on the New 
York Stock Exchange at 3/4 of 1  percent. 
These extreme credit conditions arose because there 
was no stretch. When the period of surplus reserves 
arose,  funds poured  into the speculative markets. 
When the period of deficient reserves arrived, all the 
banks sought to contract their loans to make good their 
reserves and we witnessed the extremes of specula- 
tion and of business embarrassment. There was nei- 
ther control  of the volume of credit, nor moderating 
influence as to rates of interest. And, finally, there was 
no control over the movements  of gold in and out of  the 
country. I recall the Governor of the Bank of England 
telling me in 1916 that one of the most menacing influ- 
ences on their reserves position was the possibility of 
a gold movement to America or from America as a 
result of our erratic money market, which no influence 
that they could exert was capable of stemming; of their 
regarding our so-called free gold market as one of the 
worst menaces  to the stability of their own  credit 
position. 
I have refreshed your memory as to the conditions 
which prevailed under the old System in order to bring 
out in contrast the extent to which it differs from pre- 
sent conditions. As things are now, when a period of 
business expansion arrives, whether it be  an annual 
and seasonal one, or whether it be due to a series of 
favorable crops at home and bad harvests abroad  — in 
other  words whether it be the short cycle of seasons or 
the long  cycle of periods  of years—such expansion, 
whatever its cause, can  now be easily financed 
because of the power of the Federal Reserve System 
to furnish the required reserve money as needed and 
thereby permit the member banks in turn and in larger 
volume to increase their loans discounts, and, corre- 
spondingly, their deposits. 
The Federal  Reserve and credit 
But  now we come to one or two grave fallacies in 
regard to the Reserve System. I fear there are many 
people who still hold to the notion that some myste- 
rious influence or process will operate when this 
enlarged volume of credit is no longer needed so that it 
will be induced, without any compulsion or persuasion, 
complacently to walk back to the Reserve Bank and 
surrender itself for cancellation. And possibly another 
fallacy still prevails among  those who believe that 
because of certain  very exacting requirements of the 
Federal Reserve Act and the regulations of the 
Reserve Board as to the type of loan which the 
Reserve  Banks may make or the character of the paper 
which they  may discount,  that there is some control 
exercised by the  Reserve System as to the  uses to 
which the  credit so extended by the Reserve Banks 
shall be applied by the borrowing member bank. Practi- 
cal experience in the operation of the Reserve System 
seems to have disclosed something of importance as 
to the way credit is extended; as to the way that credit 
is retired when it is no longer needed; and as to the 
impossibility of control of the use that shall be made of 
it while it is in existence. 
First as to the extension  of credit, which may be 
described  as normal or seasonal  or necessary  and 
legitimate. Practically the only motive which impels a 
member bank to borrow from the Reserve Bank is to 
make good an existing, or expected, impairment of its 
reserve. I think  you may accept my statement that this 
is true, but let me give one illustration. Every member 
bank is  required by law to maintain a certain minimum 
reserve on deposit with its Reserve Bank and, if it fails 
to do so, it is subject to an interest penalty upon the 
amount of the impairment considerably higher than the 
regular  rate of discount of the Reserve Bank. This 
reserve in some cities is figured as a weekly average 
and in the rest of the country as the average of a fort- 
night. Every member bank must report its reserve posi- 
tion and submit to penalty if the average is impaired. 
Now, in practice, the way this works is very simple, and 
I  shall use the case of a large New York City bank to 
illustrate: Early in the morning it sends its exchanges 
through the Clearing House and, as the result, it has to 
pay out reserve  money or receives surplus  reserve 
money according to whether it is debtor or creditor. 
Throughout the day it has deposits made and with- 
drawn; it makes new loans and has old loans repaid; it 
buys and sells securities and foreign exchange  and fur- 
nishes currency to customers.  And  as the result of 
these and other transactions, at some hour of the day 
the member bank must make up what it calls its "posi- 
tion." If its reserve has become impaired as the result 
of the day's business, it borrows from us to make good 
its reserve. If the day's transactions give rise to a sur- 
plus reserve with us, the proper thing for the member 
bank to do would be to at once repay any funds which 
it had already borrowed from the Reserve Bank, 
although it may not do so. The chances are that if it 
does not do so it will be because it has an opportunity 
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in paying off the Reserve Bank —  that is to say, it can 
lend the money at a higher rate than the rate which it 
pays us upon its loan, namely our discount rate. 
You will observe that in every case, and practically 
every day,  the member bank, in gauging its reserve 
position, must of necessity determine whether it shall 
borrow,  and if so how much, or whether it shall repay 
borrowings already made, and if so how much, and the 
alternative to borrowing or repaying is either withdraw- 
ing loans from the market in some form, if it is short, or 
making additional loans, if it is over, without recourse 
to the Reserve Bank in either case. Now, in the long 
run, it is my belief  that the greatest influence upon the 
member bank in adjusting its daily position is the influ- 
ence of profit or loss; that  while it may regularly borrow 
to make good impaired reserves, it will repay its bor- 
rowing  at the earliest possible  moment  unless  the 
inducement of profit leads it to continue borrowing and 
to employ any surplus that arises  in fresh loans.  It may, 
therefore, be safely  stated that as business expands 
for seasonal reasons or for any other reason, member 
banks will borrow from the Reserve Banks to make 
good deficient reserves caused by the expansion of 
their loans, provided the rate at the Reserve Bank is 
not so high as to make that borrowing too costly. But, 
on the other hand, if borrowing at the Reserve Bank is 
profitable beyond a certain  point, there will be strong 
temptation to use surplus reserves when they arise for 
the making of additional loans rather than for repaying 
the Reserve Bank. 
I shall discuss the question of rate control later, but I 
wish first to emphasize this important fact:  Practically 
all borrowing  by member  banks  from the Reserve 
Banks is ex post facto. The condition which gave rise 
to the need for borrowing had already come into exis- 
tence before the application to borrow from the 
Reserve Bank was made, and experience has shown 
that large borrowings in New York City have in the past 
usually been explained by the member bank as caused 
by the borrowing operation  of the Treasury, by sea- 
sonal demands, but more frequently  because of the 
withdrawal of deposits. 
Now as to the limitations which the Federal Reserve 
Act seeks to impose as to the character of paper which 
a Reserve Bank may discount. When a member bank's 
reserve balance is impaired, it borrows to make it 
.good, and it is quite impossible to determine to what 
particular  purpose the money so borrowed may have 
been applied. It is simply the  net  reserve deficiency 
caused by a great mass of transactions. The borrowing 
member bank selects the paper which it brings to the 
Reserve Bank for discount not with regard to the rate 
which it bears, but with regard to various elements of 
convenience, that is, the denomination of the paper, its 
maturity, whether it is  in form to be easily and inexpen- 
sively delivered physically to the Reserve Bank or not, 
and  it makes little difference to the borrowing bank 
what  transactions may have caused the impairment of 
its reserve, because the paper which it discounts with 
the Reserve Bank may have no relation whatever to the 
impairment that has  arisen. To specify  more exactly, 
because this is an important point, suppose a member 
bank's reserve became impaired solely because on a 
given day it had made a number of loans on the stock 
exchange; it might then come to us with commercial 
paper which it had discounted two months before and 
which had no relation whatever to the transactions of 
the day; and with the proceeds of the discount make 
good the impairment. If it was the design of the authors 
of the Federal Reserve Act to prevent these funds so 
advanced by  Federal Reserve Banks from being 
loaned on the stock exchange or to nonmember state 
banks or  in  any other type of ineligible  loan, there 
would be only one way to prevent the funds being so 
used, and that is by preventing the member banks from 
making  any ineligible loans whatsoever,  or deny it 
loans if it had. And, in fact, during the  peak of the 
period of expansion  I  believe the amount of paper 
which had been discounted with the Federal Reserve 
Bank equalled only about 14 percent of the loans and 
discounts Of the  member banks. The member banks 
undoubtedly had a very much larger amount of eligible 
paper than  indicated  by this small  percentage, but, 
beyond  that, a great mass of ineligible loans, and 
surely it cannot be claimed that the provisions of the 
Act, which specify so exactly what paper is  eligible, 
can  possibly  have exercised any influence  upon the 
application of the proceeds of these loans by  the mem- 
ber banks. 
I have enlarged upon this point so as to bring out 
this fact: that the expansion of the loan account of the 
Federal Reserve Banks, which as you know furnishes 
the foundation for a much greater expansion of loans 
and deposits of the commercial banks, can be brought 
about as the result of any expansion in the banking 
position  of the country,  no  matter what may be its 
cause. The eligible paper we discount is simply the 
vehicle through which the credit of the Reserve System 
is conveyed to the members. But the definition of eligi- 
bility does not effect the slightest control over the use 
to which the proceeds are applied. 
Going a step further, this  means that the Reserve 
Banks will  be  subject  to demands  upon them, 
expressed to be sure in the form of eligible paper but 
which may have had their origin in any sort of expan- 
sive development, stock speculation, real estate spec- 
ulation, crop moving, building operation, foreign bond 
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through the borrowings not only of the United States 
Government in the market, but indirectly through bor- 
rowings of all kinds which have the effect of impairing 
reserves. 
Now going still one step further, let me emphasize 
the contrast between the conditions which prevailed in 
the  old System and those which  have now arisen.  I 
have pointed  out how, in the extremes of the trade 
cycle, we have on the one hand impaired reserves and 
very high interest rates and on the other hand surplus 
reserves and very low interest  rates. That condition 
has now quite disappeared. In actual operation, when 
the reserves of the member banks become impaired, 
they promptly borrow and they do not have to scramble 
around among their customers  or  on the stock 
exchange to call loans so as to make good the impair- 
ment. So, on the other hand, when they have surplus 
reserves, they are generally inclined to repay what they 
may have already borrowed from us rather than make 
new loans, provided of course our rates are properly 
adjusted to market rates, and they will continue to do 
so unless borrowing from the Reserve Bank becomes 
so profitable as to be a temptation. 
Now you will observe that under the old System we 
experienced these  periods of reserve deficiency and 
extremely high rates for money and reserve surpluses 
and extremely low rates for money, but under the pres- 
ent System all that has changed.  Broadly speaking, 
there is no surplus reserve in the hands of the banks, 
whether members of the System or not. When business 
expansion or new loans cause impaired reserves, the 
member banks borrow from us; when surplus reserves 
arise for one reason or another, they repay to us. The 
consequence  of this is, of course, that  we have no such 
extraordinarily high or low interest rates as sometimes 
obtained. The funds flow in  and out of the Reserve 
Bank day by day as sort of a leveling off process, so to 
speak. Now in a banking System where 10,000 banks, 
which represent over  55 percent of the banking 
deposits of the country, have convenient access to a 
source of borrowing such as the Reserve Banks, what 
are the possibilities that this borrowing may get beyond 
control; that the volume of credit may become danger- 
ously enlarged and that in  consequence we  may be 
guilty of furnishing  credit which might only result in 
marking up prices without any increase in production, 
with all of the injustices which are sure to result? 
The chances of such a development can only be 
understood if one is familiar with credit conditions in all 
parts of the country. They could well be expressed in 
the form of a map upon which current local rates of 
interest throughout the country would be expressed as 
maps are shaded to indicate mountain ranges and their 
peaks. It would be found that over a large part of the 
south, considerable portions of the middle west,  and 
generally  throughout  the Rocky Mountain region, interest 
rates are not only high, but in many cases as high as 
12 percent. Not only do the usury laws of some states 
permit banks to lend money as high as 10 percent or 
12 percent, but in practice a very large number of the 
smaller banks throughout the' country in states which 
permit high rates make practically all of their loans at 
rates ranging all the way from 8 percent to 12 percent, 
and there are many banks that charge even  higher 
rates by various roundabout methods. But  the rate diffi- 
culty becomes more acute when it is realized that even 
within one Federal Reserve district of large area like 
Kansas City or San Francisco, there may be sections 
where rates as high as 12 percent are charged, but on 
the contrary, in the money centers, especially in the 
city where the Reserve Bank is located, the rates may 
be little if any higher than those prevailing in New York 
City. 
Bearing in mind, however, that a member bank may 
be impelled to borrow not only because deposits are 
withdrawn but equally because it has made loans, in all 
of  those sections where the loaning rate is much higher 
than the Reserve Bank rate, the temptation will natu- 
rally be  ever present to expand loans indefinitely so 
long as the Reserve Bank is in a position to lend. This 
situation, which prevails in some parts of the country, 
is quite different from that in New York City, where the 
vast bulk of bank loans are made at a fairly uniform 
rate and where it is possible for the Reserve Bank, by 
an adjustment of its rate, to exert some restraint upon 
the extent to which its members borrow from it. 
Discount rate changes and gold movements 
Deferring until later any further discussion of methods 
of control of borrowing, which means control of the vol- 
ume of credit, let me now refer to what  appears to me 
to be the most perplexing difficulty in the exercise of 
such control as may be possible through the discount 
rate. It is a condition which has arisen as a result of 
the war and it is appropriate to introduce this part of 
the discussion by quoting from the report made by the 
British Committee on Currency and Foreign Exchange,' 
freqently called the Cunliffe report, as follows: 
Whenever before  the war the bank's  reserves 
were being  depleted, the rate of discount was 
raised.  This, as we have already explained, by 
reacting upon the rates  for  money  generally, 
acted as a check which operated in two ways. On 
1Comrnjttee on Currency  and Foreign Exchanges  after the  War 
better known as the  Cunliffe Committee  after its chairman Lord 
Walter Cunliffe, former Governor of the Bank of England. 
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to attract  gold to this country or to keep here gold 
that might have left. On the other hand, by less- 
ening the demands for loans for business pur- 
poses, they tended to check expenditures and so 
to lower prices in this country, with the result that 
imports  were discouraged  and exports  encour- 
aged, and the exchanges thereby turned in  our 
favor. Unless this twofold check is kept in working 
order the whole  currency system will be imper- 
illed. To maintain the connection between a gold 
drain  and a rise in  the rate of discount is 
essential. 
Various  influences  were set in  motion  by the war 
which resulted in our receiving over $2,000,000,000 in 
gold in excess of what we held before the war started, 
giving  us  now  a  total  gold  stock  of  about 
$3,800,000,000, of which nearly $3,100,000,000  is held 
by the  Reserve Banks. This is  roughly a billion and 
three-quarters  in  excess of what the minimum legal 
reserve requirements of the Federal Reserve Act would 
now require us to hold against our present deposit and 
note liabilities.  Under the provisions of the Federal 
Reserve Act  as originally passed by Congress, the 
Federal Reserve Banks, when all of the reserves had 
been  paid in, would  have .had a loaning  power of 
roughly  $900,000,000.  With  this enormous mass  of 
gold now in our hands, we have a lending power at 
present  in  excess of the billion and one-quarter of 
loans and  investments now made of roughly 
$4,400,000,000. Had there been no war there would 
have been no disturbance to the foreign  exchanges. 
With the foreign exchanges fluctuating within the gold 
shipping points, any considerable expansion of credit 
in this country which caused prices  to sharply advance 
would very probably have been penalized by a gold 
export movement. With the exchanges as they now are, 
that is,  with  the dollar at a premium  practically the 
world over, gold  cannot be exported, certainly  not in 
large quantity except after such a period of expansion 
and rising prices in this country as would entail a veri- 
table orgy of speculation; such a debauch in credit, in 
fact, as would reduce the purchasing power of the dol- 
lar progressively, first possibly to the level of the cur- 
rencies of the neutral countries, then to sterling, then 
to the franc, etc. And this brings me to the point  which 
is of such importance to the management of the. 
Reserve System. 
Before the war, as is set out in the Cunliffe report, a 
large gold export movement was the visible and con- 
vincing evidence, not only to the management of the 
bank of issue, but to the country  generally, that the 
bank rate must be raised. To be sure, other conditions 
than a gold movement could well justify increasing the 
rate of discount of the bank of issue, but a large gold 
export movement,  such, for instance, as we suffered in 
the early 1890s, which even impaired the gold reserves 
of the Government of the United States, would require 
little argument or explanation to convince the country 
that the bank of issue must take steps to protect the 
gold reserve. 
As we are now situated, it is true that we may from 
time to time lose small amounts of gold to those coun- 
tries where the currency has not been greatly depreci- 
ated. We have recently shipped some gold to Canada 
and it was a natural movement because the Canadian 
exchange had gone to a premium and dollars to a dis- 
count as the result of a large loan which the Canadian 
Government floated in this country. And from time to 
time the currents of trade and the balance of interna- 
tional payments may indeed result in small amounts of 
our excessive gold holdings being withdrawn, but with 
the currencies of most of the trading and banking 
nations of the world so much depreciated below ours— 
ranging from 10 percent in the case of sterling to the 
vanishing point in the case of Germany, Austria, and 
Russia  — it seems altogether unlikely that  any consider- 
able amount of our surplus gold will be taken from us. 
Other than such a debauch of expansion as I have 
described, the only possibilities of early losses in gold 
that I can see would be through radical changes in the 
monetary laws of those nations whose currencies are 
greatly depreciated, implying, of course, the balancing 
of their governmental revenues and expenditures. 
In the absence of the possibility, I may say even the 
remote possibility, of any such movement and in the 
face  of the conditions which  I have described as to 
interest rates In different sections of the country, what 
should be the policy of the Federal Reserve System in 
exercising this function which  is of such supreme 
importance of regulating or influencing the volume of 
credit? 
Methods of regulating credit  volume 
This brings us in fact to those important questions of 
policy in which human judgment plays so large a part. 
Various suggestions as to the policy of the  Reserve 
System have been advanced by critics and students. 
They all seem to lead back  to the two methods of regu-. 
lation of credit volume which are, after  all, fundamental. 
One may be described as the exercise of discretion by 
each Reserve Bank as to the amount which it is willing 
or which it thinks wise to lend to borrowing members. 
The  .other is the exercise of such influence or control 
as is possible through the fixing of the discount rate. It 
might at first seem that these two methods of regula- 
tion were in conflict with each other, but they are in fact 
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tages and limitations. 
In a general way it is my opinion, although others 
may differ from me, that so long as present conditions 
exist, rate regulation will operate effectively in the long 
run as to the great mass of American bank credit, that 
is, as to those banks which hold the principal amount 
of deposits and  loans, provided the rates are wisely 
established by all of the Reserve Banks, and especially 
by those Reserve  Banks  which are located in the 
larger cities of the East. It is in those centers that inter- 
est rates are  lowest and most stable and where the 
range is narrowest between minimum and  maximum 
rates; but in the sections of the country more remote 
from the money  centers, where interest rates  are 
higher, as was earlier  described, the exercise of a wise 
discretion by the management of the Reserve Bank is 
imperative, otherwise the facilities of the Reserve Sys- 
tem  might be abused  by member  banks borrowing 
excessively for profit. 
Let me describe some of  the difficulties of exercising 
discretion. First, the discretion, as  I have  earlier 
described, must be exercised ex post facto. The trans- 
actions giving rise to impaired reserves by the borrow- 
ing  members  have already  occurred  when  the 
borrowing from the Reserve Bank is desired. Applying 
discretion to the borrowings of members under these 
circumstances really means that all one can do is to 
scold them.  If the funds  are not advanced to make 
good the reserve, then indeed the reserve balance is 
used by the member just the same only the penalty 
rate is higher. In the course of time that bank would 
restore its reserve because the law would prevent its 
paying dividends or making new loans until it is 
restored. That type of scolding,  however, generally 
causes irritation. 
A second difficulty is geographical. How can discre- 
tion be exercised in the case of applications for loans 
by member banks so remote that even the mail takes 
four days one way? 
A third difficulty  arises as to the basis upon which 
discretion shall  be  exercised. Who is to judge as to 
whether the transactions which  cause the reserve 
impairment  were justified or unjustified? A loss of 
deposits, theoretically, would always justify borrowing, 
but if the impairment arises because of loans made 
how is a judgment possible as to any one loan without 
judging equally of all loans made by a member bank? 
Fourth, even assuming that such  judgment were pos- 
sible, who shall say how much each member bank shall 
be permitted to borrow without exceeding the bounds 
of prudence? Is it fair to assume that a member bank 
should liquidate once a year, or twice a year, so that its 
borrowing requirements are seasonal only, or should 
we admit that a certain amount of borrowing from the 
Reserve Banks may be permanent? Section 4 of the 
Act provides that a Reserve Bank shall "extend to each 
member  bank such discounts, advancements and 
accommodations  as may be safely and reasonably 
made with due regard for the claims and demands of 
other member banks."  Much difficulty will be experi- 
enced by the bank managers of any one district in 
making  these nice decisions as to its own district mem- 
bers only but, extending this to all the managers of the 
12  Reserve  Banks,  with the 10,000 members  with 
which they must deal, it would  indeed appear to be 
impossible to exercise such discretion with universal 
justice. Indeed it may well be that in the absence of a 
Branch Banking System the Federal Reserve System 
will be the vehicle for furnishing a certain  amount of 
credit permanently  to those  remote  sections  of the 
country where interest rates are high and where liquid 
capital is deficient. 
A fifth difficulty appears to arise as to the regulation 
of the total amount of credit for the whole banking sys- 
tem,  as distinguished  from the total which  any one 
member may be allowed to borrow. Obviously the 12 
Reserve Banks cannot  work out such a nice mathe- 
matical arrangement  of credit as would  serve the 
requirements  of all the banking  System  and work 
smoothly, because these requirements vary greatly at 
different seasons of the year and in different sections. 
A sixth difficulty is at once obvious were the System 
to assume responsibility for declining loans to mem- 
bers which made it necessary for those members to 
decline loans to customers. It has always seemed to 
me that the primary responsibility for any loan made by 
a bank to its customer should rest with the officers and 
directors of that bank and that the Reserve Bank 
should never assume that responsibility nor be willing 
to accept the consequences of exercising it. 
And a seventh and last difficulty, although this may 
not indeed  be all of them,  is one which I regard as 
more serious than any of the others —  The exercise of 
powers conferred  by the Reserve Act upon the 
Reserve Banks by this rule of personal discretion,  I 
fear, would  develop inevitably in time a bureaucratic 
attitude of mind on the part of the managers of the 
Reserve Banks which would be unfortunate indeed for 
the welfare of the whole banking System.  Power 
excites appetite for more power.  Bankers in time would 
rebel and the public would rebel. 
Now, on the other  hand, it must be admitted that if a 
member bank is able to loan all of its funds at 10 per- 
cent or at 12 percent, and if it is paying as high as 
5 percent interest upon its deposits and has the oppor- 
tunity to discount paper at its Reserve Bank at 41/2 per- 
cent, the temptation to make the additional profit by 
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well be escaped. Nor can the Reserve Bank charge 
that  member bank a rate which would operate as a 
restraint to its borrowing without charging a like rate to 
member banks in its own city or in the money centers 
of its district, which would put the resources of the 
Reserve Bank entirely beyond the reach of most, if not 
all, of the large banks of the district. Therefore, how- 
ever difficult may be the exercise of discretion, in some 
Reserve districts that would appear for the present to 
be the only means of exercising a regulatory influence. 
On the other  hand, let us see how the rate will oper- 
ate. I think one should look upon the credit structure of 
the country as an inverted pyramid at the base of 
which is a foundation of bricks of gold which enjoy the 
peculiar power of sustaining each its own proportion of 
the entire  inverted pyramid. Those bricks of gold are 
the bank reserves held by the  Reserve Bank. If one 
brick  is taken out of the base, the series of stones rest- 
ing upon it, representing  the volume of credit sustained 
by that reserve brick, must inevitably come down. And 
if a brick is added, by so much the pyramid is very 
shortly enlarged. If the Reserve Bank rate is so low as 
to be an  inducement to borrowing, additional tiers of 
bricks will be laid at the foundation and the pyramid will 
be by so much enlarged; and the reverse is equally 
true if the rate  does not induce borrowing  —  the size of 
the pyramid may be kept unchanged, or even reduced. 
A rate  control of the volume of credit has a variety  of 
advantages. One is that it is democratic. It applies to 
all alike and it requires little, if any, expostulation and 
remonstrance to make it effective. It must be admitted 
that an advance in the discount rates by the Reserve 
Banks will not necessarily influence promptly the 
mountain peaks of high interest rates in some sections. 
But I rather doubt whether it is necessary that it should 
do so. Although not capable of statistical support, I 
think  the statement may be hazarded from past experi- 
ence that a rate which is effective in checking borrow- 
ing in the money centers,  or even in  reducing 
borrowing, will indirectly be an influence in all sections 
of the country. It certainly has the effect of what  I might 
describe as "driving  borrowers back home." It is cus- 
tomary for many concerns which do a large business to 
borrow in the cheapest  money  markets,  no  matter 
where their offices  and business  may be located.  If 
New York, for instance, should advance discount rates 
and member banks in turn advanced rates to their cus- 
tomers, a certain  number  of these out-of-town  bor- 
rowers would go to their local banks for their loans if 
the rates there are satisfactory so as to enable the bor- 
rower to pay off in New York. This process I believe 
would be found, could it be analyzed, to be many times 
repeated, so that the effect of rate changes in the 
12 Reserve cities is not confined alone to those cities 
but extends throughout the country. 
Another point frequently overlooked in regard to the 
effect of the rate is due to lack of understanding of the 
way in which borrowing from the Reserve Bank origi- 
nates, that is, through impaired reserves. Every bank 
knows about what its loanable  funds cost it on the 
average and about what it receives on all of the money 
which it is loaning. It knows about what its expenses 
and overhead amount to, and the difference is its profit. 
When a bank's reserve becomes impaired so that it 
must borrow, it does not pick out a particular piece of 
paper which it has discounted at a higher rate of inter- 
est and then rediscount that paper at the Reserve 
Bank rate and figure that it is making a profit, but it is 
much more liable to see whether the borrowing from 
the Reserve Bank at the Reserve Bank rate involves in 
point of fact an absolute loss, or whether it may not be 
less expensive to reduce loans or sell investments  and 
avoid borrowings. Expressing it differently, the rate at 
which a Reserve Bank lends to its member bank has 
no particular relation to the rate which a member bank 
receives on any of its transactions, but it has a relation 
to the average of all rates received  by the member 
bank and the average cost of all of its loanable funds. 
And from this I have always concluded what I firmly 
believe to be the fact, that a Reserve Bank rate in 
order to be effective in restraining  undue borrowing 
does not necessarily need to be a penalty rate, that is 
to say, a rate fixed so high that there Will  be no differ- 
ential in favor of  the borrowing bank on any paper  which 
it may have taken from its customers, even the highest. 
rate paper. But an effective rate will likely be somewhere 
within the range between the average  cost of all its loan- 
able funds, including overhead, and the average that it 
receives upon  all of its earning assets, with due 
allowance, of course, for loss of interest on reserves. 
The chief advantage of rate control, however,  is in 
the way it serves more definitely to regulate the total 
volume of credit as distinguished from the total amount 
of loans to any one individual member bank. I would 
regard the determination of the amount to be loaned to 
an  individual member bank as a credit matter to be 
determined just as any loan would be determined by 
any  bank to any customer. But on the other hand,  I 
would  regard the rate policy of the Federal Reserve 
System as a national credit policy more directly related 
to regulating the volume of credit in the country so as 
to maintain stable credit conditions. 
Finally, however,  we must recognize that there are 
many people who believe that more money, and cheap 
money, means prosperity and happiness. To those peo- 
ple an advance of discount rates may at times  be diffi- 
cult to explain. It is on that account that the absence of 
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is for that reason, as well as for many others, that the 
world will be better off by a prompt return to the gold 
standard and free gold payments. 
Permit me now to make a brief resume of this long 
argument: The Reserve Banks have been given the 
power to create reserve balances and to a large extent 
to regulate the volume of credit. That  volume of credit 
expands in  response to ex post facto borrowing  by 
member banks; the mass of their transactions causing 
the  borrowing  having  already  occurred,  there is  no 
means by which the Reserve Bank can control the use 
which is made of the funds which it loans to its mem- 
bers. Credit so borrowed from the  Reserve Banks is 
less  likely to return for cancellation  when no longer 
legitimately required if discount rates are too low, and 
a high discount rate will operate to induce its return. 
The present banking System has created a situation 
where there is no surplus of banking reserves in the 
country, and where there is not likely to be a  deficiency. 
The real reserve barometer is the reserve percentage 
of the Reserve Banks. The impulse which will lead the 
Reserve System to change rates must for the present 
largely arise from general conditions, and it cannot be 
expected that the impulse to advance rates will be 
given by gold exports for a long time to come. There- 
fore, the regulation of  the volume of credit which is the 
chief  function of the Reserve System must be effected 
by a combination of rate changes and due caution as 
to members' borrowings. 
The Federal Reserve System has always impressed 
me as being essentially a social institution. It is not a 
supergovernment, it is simply the creature of Congress, 
brought into being in response to a public demand. It 
was not created only to serve the banker, the farmer, 
the manufacturer,  the merchant, or the Treasury of the 
United States. It was brought into being to serve them 
all. Its guiding influence is not profit. Practically all its 
receipts over expenses  go to the government.  For 
some the service it performs is direct, for others it is 
indirect, but it is not less definite nor any less impor- 
tant. It needs and asks that it be given the benefit of 
intelligent study and enlightened criticism.  Its future 
depends upon its own good behavior and upon its suc- 
cess in winning  and  holding the confidence  of the 
public. 
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